



CRFCA

Council of Reserve Forces'
and Cadets' Associations

THE UNITED KINGDOM RESERVE FORCES

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM

ANNUAL REPORT 2019



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FOREWORD

1. The Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Independent Commission's report concluded that: the Reserve Forces were in decline; Reservist roles had not been modernised; the potential of the Reserves was not exploited; and the Reserves were not being used efficiently. The Commission also identified a need for an *"... independent mechanism to report to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Parliament on the state of the Reserves."* Having been a member of the External Scrutiny Team (EST) that produces that report since its formation in 2013, and as a retired senior Reservist, I was delighted to take over as Chairman from Lieutenant General Robin Brims as he stepped down after six years. I would like to record all our appreciation for Robin's dedication to ensuring the EST, from its inception, carried out its work diligently and met its mandate to scrutinise and report on the implementation of the FR20 programme and more recently the overall state of the UK's Reserve Forces.
2. As we observed last year the FR20 programme, which came to an end as at 30 March 2019, fundamentally has been a success and we congratulated the MOD and the single Services for their hard work and application in achieving this end. It is perhaps obvious to say but it showed the value of a programme that had a clear start point in the conclusions of the Independent Commission's Review of the Reserve Forces, a detailed programme of deliverables, most importantly funding, external scrutiny and consistent Ministerial attention.
3. But following the planned end of the programme in March this year we are sensitive to the danger of lessons learnt being forgotten and the many competing priorities in Defence diminishing a consistent focus on the Reserves. We believe the EST has a role in playing a part in retaining the corporate memory of the Commission's work, its recommendations and applying this knowledge to our scrutiny of the management of the Reserves each year.
4. As expressed in our report this year, we do have concerns there is a risk the Whole Force design of Regular and Reserve personnel jointly providing the necessary scale and range of capabilities could be compromised if the Reserve component is not routinely used. The intent is certainly there, but financial restraints seem to have reduced activity to a worrying degree this year. It is perhaps at times easy to think of the additional expenditure of the use of reserves on full time deployments and exercises as an additional in year cost, rather than an essential investment in their training and experience. The Whole Force model requires a reasonable and consistent level of military activity for the Reserves and we welcome this is now being acknowledged and we look forward to reporting in the future on clear policy supported by the necessary resources to achieve this aim.
5. Despite our observation on the challenges of resourcing the use of Reserves we do not doubt the senior leaders and commanders of all three Services intent, appreciation of, and commitment to, the Whole Force and their understanding of the range of skills and specialist capabilities that can be provided cost effectively by our volunteer reserves. The Commission recognised this and we feel there is much more to be gained from society's vast pool of talent with greater imagination and flexibility on terms of service to meet the ever more complex range of required military capabilities.

6. As seems to be the case each year, we make observations on the culture and frictions experienced by reservists and, perhaps this will always be the case, but does reinforce the need for continual reserve focus by the Services. The culture of the Regular and Reserves will never be exactly the same as their circumstances are fundamentally different, but through this continual focus the knowledge and respect for each other can be nurtured and maintained.
7. I would conclude by reiterating the impact and success of the FR20 programme, but as the formal programme has ended, equally observe that the MOD and the Services must be careful of lessening the attention given to our Reserve Forces because of this very success. Of the four conclusions of the Independent Commission, the first has been completed – the decline has been arrested, but, as always with recruiting, it is a never-ending business and, as we make clear in the Report, this requires persistent effort. Nevertheless, it is certainly our belief there is more to do – encapsulated in the other three conclusions – if the significant potential for our volunteer reserves to contribute more to the UK's military capability is to be realised.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S F N Lalor', with a stylized flourish at the end.

S F N Lalor
Major General (Retired)
28 June 2019



INTRODUCTION

1. The FR20 Independent Commission identified a requirement for an annual report on the overall health of the Reserve Forces. The first two reports were provided at the request of the Secretary of State (SofS) for Defence¹ in 2013 and 2014. On 1 October 2014, the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations (RFCAs) had a statutory duty placed on them to report annually to Parliament on the state of the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces². This will be the fifth report under these statutory arrangements.
2. We submitted our last report through the SofS for Defence on 29 June 2018. It was placed in the Library of the House on 23 July 2018. On 10 December 2018, he responded to our report, updating us on progress and commenting on our recommendations. It is at Annex F.
3. **Methodology.** In our approach to writing this year's report, we conducted a review of all the previous recommendations – 66 in total from six reports, see Annex D – and their implementation and grouped the themes of what we consider to be the most significant into five headings as outlined below. With these in mind, we started the year visiting Headquarters and Establishments with Reserve responsibilities to determine what they believe they have achieved in the preceding year, their plans for the forthcoming one, and how this, and what they had achieved before, were aligned with the FR20 programme. We then visited a cross-section of units around the country to understand the situation 'on the ground' and to better understand some of the nuances of measures being undertaken, again using the RFCAs to coordinate our unit visits on a regional basis. We were able to meet many Reservists from all three Services. This gave many opportunities to explore the benefits of whole force activities with both the Reservists themselves and their employing Regular commanders. However, at the outset we first examined whether the Services had met the manning targets set by the FR20 programme.

REPORT THEMES

4. The FR20 Commission came to four broad conclusions that required change and early action: the Reserve Forces were in decline; Reservist roles had not been modernised; the potential of the Reserves was not exploited; and the Reserves were not being used efficiently. It made 27 recommendations, summarised in a digest at Annex C, which led to the FR20 programme ending on 31 March 2019.
5. In overall terms, we judge the FR20 programme to have been a success – it sought to rectify and '*arrest the severe decline in the state of the Reserves*', and the outcomes thus far rightly should be applauded given the challenges presented. As can be seen from the detailed manning figures at Annex H, in pure numerical terms, even though the overall manning target of trained strength was missed, that decline has been arrested and manning is on an upward trend. Nevertheless, we judge that there is still work to be done if the other three conclusions of the Commission's report are to be met. To this end, we would wish to highlight two areas of concern: the utility of the Reserve within the Whole Force design and the conditions of service under which they are used on operations and exercise.

1. MSU 4/4/2/10 dated 31 July 2012; for convenience these Terms of Reference are at Annex A.

2. Defence Reform Act, 14 May 2014, Chapter 20 Part 3 Paragraph 47. Extract at Annex B.

FUTURE RESERVES 2020 PROGRAMME

6. The target for the FR20 programme, as at 1 April 2019, was for 35,060 trained Reserve personnel across the three Services. It was undershot by 2,500 – reaching only 32,560 trained personnel.
 - a. **Royal Navy.** In our 2018 Report, we highlighted the savings measures that MOD and the Royal Navy took against the FR20 programme and impact that it might have on recruiting – we doubted whether the Royal Navy would be able to hit its 3,100 trained strength target. Regrettably, our prediction came true. While its trained strength has increased by 70 on 2017/18 numbers to 2,830, the Royal Navy fell short of its target of 3,100 by 270. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that its overall strength is 3,850, which bodes well if it can get its recruits through the recruiting medical and training pipeline (the Royal Navy attests applicants before their medical). We commend the additional money that was spent on marketing late in the financial year – the results speak for themselves and we note that the untrained strength is once more improving significantly.
 - b. **Army.** While the Army increased its trained strength by 120 when compared to 2018, it fell short by 3,030 personnel of its target of 30,100. Of note its overall strength fell by 240 to 29,470. Much of this is due to the failings of the Defence Recruiting System (DRS). As we reported last year, trained strength held up because of the recruits already in the system, but the suspected 'black hole' of a lack of recruits was indeed there, not helped by the reduction in the number of applicants.
 - c. **Royal Air Force.** The Royal Air Force's recruiting programme has been a success – as at 1 April 2019 its trained strength number was 2,660, 800 over its target of 1,860, with an overall strength of 3,080. However, although of these some 1900 are Part Time Volunteer Reservists (PTVR), the remainder are made up of ex-Regulars on volunteer terms and some 320 on Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS)/Additional Duties Commitment (ADC). More worryingly, although the reduction in the number of PTVR applicants has been reversed – interest from RAF 100 events has helped – only 62% of the annual target of PTVR recruits was achieved.

It is disappointing the recruiting targets were missed as we do believe that they could have been met if the recruiting system had been more efficient and effective (more below) – the interest to join was there, but we assess too many applicants 'gave up' in frustration with the inadequacies of the system; a persistent theme throughout all our previous reports.

7. **FR20 Funding.** In a statement to Parliament in July 2013³, SofS said the MOD would be investing £1.8bn in the Reserve over 10 years. We made the point last year that taking savings from the FR20 programme, minor in terms of the overall Defence programme, have a disproportionate effect to the value delivered. Moreover, greater funds are then required to arrest decline. The sharp drop in expressions of interest and untrained strength experienced by the Royal Navy can be directly linked to its two financial savings measures. We welcome the fact that none of the three Services have taken savings this year, and we continue **to recommend that the MOD and the Services do not take further savings measures from the FR20 £1.8bn funding, given the FR20 programme trained strength targets have been missed and ask MOD and all Services to clarify what funding remains, and plans to spend it over the next four years.**

3. 2012 White Paper – Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued.

Whole Force design – utility of the Reserves

8. It has been a consistent theme in Defence since the Strategic Defence Security Review (SDSR) 2010 that the Reserve Force should be an integral part of the Future Force, developed further by the Defence Reform Review and FR20 Commission that *'Defence should adopt a Whole Force Concept which optimises the most cost-effective balance of Regular, Reserve, Contractor and Civilian manpower'*. This was echoed by the SoF in December 2018 in a statement to Parliament – *'We will access more effectively the talents of our 'Whole Force' across all three Services, Regulars, reserves'* – when introducing the Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) report, which said that the Reserve is very much part of this programme in order to *'strengthen the performance of the Whole Force'* and *'remain a key part of our national flexibility and resilience.'*
9. Whole Force design is predicated on the Regular and Reserve elements of a Force being inter-dependent (the Army's 82,000 Regulars being determined by having a trained Reserve of 30,100)⁴. If an element of it is not used, then the capability of the Whole Force is diminished. To this end, the Reserve should be viewed as a capability in its own right and expenditure on it, especially including mobilisation, should be a core cost. The latter should not be viewed as an optional cost that might be subject to financial pressures, or used as a financial in-year regulator. We are concerned that self-imposed financial restraint is putting a block on using the Reserve, particularly for the Army, and while we acknowledge that the Army regularly has overspent its mobilisation budget, this is, perhaps, symptomatic that it has been set too low.
10. We agree with Chief of the General Staff that the Reserve should be relevant, useable, credible and flexible. But key to this utility is that it should be used. Although we understand the financial pressures faced by the three Services, given their under manning, it could be seen as counter intuitive not to make greater use of the Reserve. Not to do so in these circumstances calls into question its credibility, both in the eyes of the Regulars and Reserve; for the former, why have a Reserve if it is not used; and the latter, the credibility of the integrated Whole Force structure.
11. We have heard the frustration of front line formations who would like to make more use of the Reserve. An immediate benefit of greater such use, as we have seen with the Royal Air Force, is to enhance harmony for hard-pressed Regulars. Although almost impossible to measure, the in-year cost of greater use of Reservists on operations to back fill Regulars is a counter-balance to the additional cost of recruiting and training the replacements of those that leave because of imbalance in harmony.
12. Central to the 'offer' is that the Reservist should have the opportunity to serve alongside their Regular counterparts on operations and exercises whether at home or abroad. During the peak of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, approximately 10% of the deployed force came from the Reserve. In 2012/13, 6.7% of the deployed force was from the Reserve, which represented 17% of

4. Ibid.

Reserve itself. In 2017/18 these figures were 2.2% and 1.8% respectively. We assess that 10% of a deployed force is too great for the Reserve to meet over a sustained period, given the consequent impact on their civilian employment but current percentages are too low if the Reserve is to play a meaningful part within the Whole Force. Although not currently in the Defence Plan, we understand from the Minister (Armed Forces) that he has directed that 5% of a deployed force should be made up of Reservists in 2019 and 8% in 2020. **We recommend that: the Services determine what is the optimum percentage of Reservists within a deployed force (between 5-8%), which meets the requirement to mobilise Reservists to sustain the Whole Force model, while being sustainable in the long-term, and fund this accordingly in their annual spending programme.**

Tri-Service Terms and Conditions of Service

13. We have recommended that the MOD should examine the *manner in which Reserves can be routinely employed on national operations or for back-fill be revisited* (16.10) and the *MOD, Joint Forces Command and the single Services review the terms under which Reserves are included on or in support of operations, in order to develop protocols which make their inclusion easier* (17.9).
14. We welcome that Reservists increasingly are being used on overseas training exercises lasting longer than two weeks (Exercise SAIF SAREEA), short term training tasks (five weeks in Uganda) and national resilience operations, now known as Defence Activity Other than Operations (DAOTO)⁵, as this is in tune with what we have recommended above.
15. However, we note that they are deployed on a variety of conditions of service – full mobilisation (designed for large scale operations), Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) (designed to replace Regulars or to cover manning gaps) and Reserve Service Days (RSD) (designed for routine training) – the differences more driven by the need to overcome bureaucratic or funding blockage to deploying the Reservist, rather than it being the appropriate condition of service suitable for that particular deployment. This was exemplified by Reservists from all three Services on Exercise SAIF SAREEA in Oman with each Service exercising different choices for their personnel deployed on the same or similar tasks. This we judge to be not only ineffective and inefficient – one method is more costly than the other – but unfair to the Reservists, and just wrong. Much of this has come about because of single Service preferences. While we are sensitive to the differences and needs of the single Services, we judge that something as fundamental as this cannot be allowed to be determined by such preferences. It requires a defence, or Whole Force approach, something that should not be impossible within a Defence-wide Reserve force of less than 40,000.
16. To this end, we understand and welcome the initiative being developed by the MOD that would allow for mobilisation on training tasks in support of operations, and also options for a tiered mobilisation package that takes account of DAOTOs on one hand and large scale operations on the other. It is our experience that Reservists are keen to volunteer and will manage their personal circumstances and employment to allow this. We fully support these initiatives and **recommend that they are developed further as a matter of priority, particularly the tiered mobilisation package as it would broaden the range of manning levers available to Commanders,**

5. DAOTO includes: Short Term Training Teams (STTT) to deliver capacity building activity; Short Term Engagement Teams (STET); visits (inwards and outwards), including high-level and senior level international engagement and ships; Defence exercises; support to export campaigns; trials including sea trials; exchange visits between personnel of allied countries; and activity such as defence education, battlefield studies, sports tours, band deployments, and adventurous training with an international engagement objective.

and thus enhance the utility of the Reserve, and answer the requirements to modernise, exploit and use the Reserve more efficiently as identified by the Commission.

Recruiting

17. We recommended in 2016 that a *'formal contract review of the Army Recruiting Partnership'* (16.1) be undertaken and again in 2017 (17.1). This was not done. We have also commented on the Defence Recruiting System (DRS), its failings and the impact.
18. The Army recruiting campaign initiated at the beginning of the year – the so called 'snowflake' campaign – has proved to be hugely successful with 2,954 applying to join the Army Reserve in January – higher than any month since October 2017 and 51% up on January 2018. Website visits rose significantly and was matched by positive social media sentiment. The trick will be to get these applicants through the recruiting pipeline to start training. It is this considerable 'time of flight' – *'in the first six months of 2018-19, half of Regular soldier applicants took up to 321 days to complete the recruitment process'*⁶ – which has bedevilled the recruiting system and is symptomatic of its deficiencies.
 - a. **Medicals.** Every year we commented on the frustration with the medical assessment process and made recommendations – *'should review the medical entry standards required of recruits and ensure that the screening contracts are appropriately incentivised and assured to achieve success'* (15.4); *'The high incidence of medical deferrals and time to resolution remain under close scrutiny in order to reduce both'* (16.3); *'Services should review their recruiting medical contracts to ensure assessments are carried out with a greater degree of consistency and common sense'* (17.5) – and it is disappointing that with such consistent reporting, problems with medicals remains. We still hear of examples where applicants are deferred or screened out because of childhood ailments, but later admitted after an appeal requiring considerable effort⁷ and money. It is the consistent biggest bugbear and source of frustration with people trying to join the Services. The Army has introduced a clinical triage before the on-line Recruiting Group Medical Declaration (RGMD) to try and identify those that are likely to be filtered out and hence free up the time of candidate managers and units for others. While such effort is commendable, we judge that it is a sticking plaster to treat the symptoms, rather a solution to cure the problem. It would appear that the RGMD is a too fine a filter since it is an on-line form that is assessed by Capita employed doctors who have a scoring system that allows for little latitude; the human interface and ability to apply judgement comes later in the process, but then it is often too late as potentially fit candidates have 'given up'.
 - b. **Enabling Resources.** The FR20 Programme has highlighted the truism that recruiting is a persistent business; it is not an activity that can be switched on and off if the Services wish to ensure a steady and consistent stream of recruits. Again we have made a number of recommendations: *'The Services should initiate work to determine the recruiting resources necessary to ensure steady state manning of the Reserve beyond the FR20 period'* (15.5), *'The Services keep under review the impact of losing Op FORTIFY enhancements (or Service equivalents) and, where appropriate to sustain recruiting beyond 2019, bring relevant elements into their core activity.'* (16.6), *'That the continued employment of RSUSOs is revisited.'*

6. NAO – Investigation into the British Army Recruiting Partnering Project dated 14 December 2018.

7. On interview, an applicant was asked what the biggest challenge he had faced, "getting here" was the answer.

(17.2). We welcome the Army's decision to continue to employ Regimental Sub-Unit Support Officers (RSUSO), but the decision to do so for only two years (up until March 2021), misses the point made above that recruiting is a persistent business. Furthermore, particularly as it was, perhaps, not understood when the Capita contract was let, Reserve recruiting has always been done locally by serving Reservists and the veteran reserve community, and should not have been centralised. **We strongly recommend that:**

(1) The three Services review their ongoing support arrangements for Reserve recruiting, to ensure the successful lessons of FR20 are not discarded; and

(2) RSUSOs are taken onto units' permanent strengths now in recognition of the vital role they play.

19. On our visits, we acknowledge the efforts to improve the process has reduced the Army's time of flight to between 84 and 140 days if there are no medical issues, but that there is still room for improvement with an average overall of 270 days (some 9 months). Nevertheless, the process to recruit someone once attracted, although simple in concept – an initial on-line screening, an interview, a medical, an assessment and then attestation once all are completed successfully – has been made sufficiently complex that the *'Army and Capita have not recruited the number of Regulars and Reserves that the Army requires in any year since the contract began.'*⁸ We will not comment further as this has been covered in much detail by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report⁹, the National Audit Office (NAO) report and the oral evidence given to the PAC on 14 Jan 19, where the Commander Home Command was very candid in his assessment. Suffice to say, the work being done into options on how recruitment will be undertaken after 2022, when the current contract is re-let, must take into account all the hard lessons to date, particularly the medical process, and we would **recommend that similar work being done by the Australians and Canadians to minimise the steps in the process (including introducing a one-stop shop) is studied closely before the contract is re-let. We further recommend that ambitious targets should be set – one month, if there are no issues, and six months if there are, and success or failure should be judged on these targets.**

Culture

20. In 2016, we recommended that the *'MOD and the Services recognise incomplete cultural change will be the main impediment to FR20 delivery and long-term Reserve sustainability, and introduce specific measures to inculcate cultural change'* (16.5). Last year, we were pleased to report the positive change in culture in how the Reserves were viewed by the Regular Armed Forces. Again, this year we are pleased to report that this trend continues – we have noticed that senior officers now refer to the Whole strength of their Service, rather than just the Regular component, which they would have instinctively thought of in the past. But, as highlighted above, much of this will depend on utility of the Reserve.

8. NAO – Investigation into the British Army Recruiting Partnering Project dated 14 December 2018.

9. PAC – Capita's contracts with the Ministry of Defence dated 1 March 2019.

21. **Frictions.** We also recommended that *'the three Services continue to examine that their courses – particularly those run by Training Schools – policies and processes are adapted to take account of the needs of the Reservist'* (18.6), highlighting areas of apparently needless frictions that penalised Reserve service. Inevitable in a large organisation they are still there. That said, it was particularly noteworthy and commendable that Defence School of Driving ran a course for one student, after others had fallen out, because they realised the impact it would have on him if they had cancelled the course. Some of the frictions we came across:

a. It is perfectly reasonable, and it is not surprising that the three Services have different conditions of service to meet their individual needs and different career structures (we do not include operational deployments as discussed above). However, it has become very apparent that issues do arise in Joint units where different standards are applied for recruitment (medical standard, age), promotion, bounty earning and retirement, particularly as all members of that unit are working in a team doing the same job. While there is more latitude in this regard in 'specialised' units (77 Brigade and the Joint Cyber Group), it does not appear to be in other units, such as the Joint Service Signals Unit (V), even though its personnel are carrying out a unique and special role. Traditionally, increasing skills and experience have been recognised by increasing rank, and therefore pay, but now this does not meet the new paradigm where rank per se necessarily is not a requirement to fulfil a role.

b. It would appear that personnel lose their Developed Vetting (DV) clearance when transferring between Regular to Reserve, even on seamless transfer. The subsequent re-application, a seemingly needless administrative and costly requirement, delays employment in the Reserve.

c. Although we acknowledge and welcome that the Defence Business Internet (DBI) is being rolled out across the Army Reserve estate, the lack of IT at most Reserve Centres is a major impediment to units and sub-units and is a major disincentive in the recruitment and retention of 'tech-savvy' Reservists, especially when it impacts on their unit role.

d. Much work has been done to gain civilian accreditation/recognition of military qualifications. The same does not always work in reverse. As an example, PTVR Royal Air Force policemen have to qualify on the military course for use of hand-cuffs and batons (Personal Safety Training), even though they may be serving civilian policemen with considerable experience of such matters. Similarly, there appears to be undue focus on rank, rather than skill set, when setting the requirement for mobilisation. Promotion tends to be slower in the Reserve, but that should not debar personnel who have the right skill set, as opposed to the right rank.

e. The needs of units in Joint Forces Command do not appear to be as well represented by Reservist staff and/or senior officers. As an example, joint units are national formations, with no bespoke physical locality to meet and train. Hence, internal site and national estate rationalisation do not always take account of their needs.

We recognise that all three Services have done much to make courses 'reserve friendly', but more could still be done. For example, we heard suggestions regarding making full use of distant learning which might minimise the face-to-face course length, while allowing more time to be spent on the aspects of career training that requires access to specialist resources and training personnel. We fully support such initiatives. **We recommend that the Services continue the drive to adapt their Service policies and practices to take account of the needs of the Reservist.**

22. We observe that the Army makes good use of Reservist deputies in the majority of its formations and higher Headquarters to give appropriate reserve advice to commanders. This ensures that the needs and nuances of reserve service are heard and allows the Army to have a deeper pool from which to grow its two star Reservist officers. Reservist staff officers at lower levels within a Headquarters also can ensure that the needs of a Reservist are considered during policy formulation at the outset, rather than as an afterthought. **We recommend that Joint Forces Command, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force consider adopting such a system in order to ensure reservist knowledge and input is considered during policy formulation and operational planning, and be able to grow a Reservist (part time) two star officer.**

Estate

23. Last year we recommended that *'the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing Reserve estate until the new strategy is implemented'* (18.8). We understand that it is the Army's intention to complete the reserve estate reorganisation in London – Project STRATTON – and then move on to wider reserve estate reorganisation/strategy. Key to this as we have reported before, is to ensure that funds realised from disposals are re-invested back into the Reserve estate not just to provide 'seed-corn' to facilitate other disposals, but also to provide the capital funding for major project works.
24. The estate remains in decline. We understand that £80m pa investment is required to sustain – replacement of structures (a roof) or services in a building (electricals) – rather than just maintain the estate in order to arrest this decline. Despite a welcomed £3m for such tasks in FY2019/20, and other late injections of money for maintenance, only enough is allocated to conduct mandatory inspections and make associated repairs to ensure compliance.
25. The Royal Navy has completed, or is in the process of completing, all 19 major projects and the 12 re-location projects; very much a FR20 success story. There were 77 projects in the Army's FR20 programme – Project NEWBURY – and it anticipates that of the 11 outstanding projects, nine will be completed by FY2019/20 and the remaining two by FY2020/21. Nevertheless, what has been frustrating is that FR20 funds, earmarked for agreed projects with an approved business cases, seemingly are unable to be released because of the MOD financial approval process for projects over £1m; unless they have an 'exception' category (operational necessity being one), they effectively are 'suspended'. As an example, at the end of FY2017/18, a project to rebuild all the garaging and technical accommodation at an Army Reserve Centre in Swindon was approved and four sub-units' equipment decamped, in anticipation of

work starting shortly, only for the funds to be held in 'suspension'. The net result is that no work has taken place, the site remains empty (since April 2018) causing at least 16 months delay to the project and considerable frustration for all concerned. We understand that this regime is suspended for FY19/20 and funding for Swindon is back on track. Nevertheless, financial figures will have to be re-evaluated as the business case is some 18 months old, causing more delay and cost. **We recommend that identified and approved FR20 projects are not subject to the 'exceptions, suspension' regime in order that agreed funding for the estate is spent as intended and not delayed.**

RESERVIST HEALTH

26. Defence Primary Health Care (DPHC) assumed responsibility for the delivery of occupational health (OH), rehabilitation services to the Reserve, dental inspections (prior to mobilisation) and treatment for operationally attributed mental health. Difficulties in recruiting staff – there is a shortage of all health care professionals nationally – combined with a reduction in funding from £6.5m to £3.5m¹⁰ for the FR20 OH and rehabilitation for the Reserve work strand, has meant that the delivery of services has been challenging. To ameliorate this, HQ DPHC now make use of personnel from the Reserve and, by so doing, will be able to deliver more services in a cost-effective manner through utilising staff only when required.
27. While DPHC identified last year that there were still improvements to be made, as can be seen below, the increased demand in all services, less mental health, have been met.

Occupational Health. DPHC provides OH support to the Reserve in two ways; either Reservists can attend any DPHC medical centre for OH support during normal working hours, or given that most Reserves are in full time employment, DPHC also provide weekend and evening clinics. As DPHC has not been successful in recruiting large numbers of full-time staff to assist, the delivery method has involved using existing civilian staff and suitably qualified Reservists to provide the out of hours clinics. In FY 18/19, DPHC delivered 2548 evening or weekend appointments, which was a slight rise from the previous year.

Rehabilitation. The provision of rehabilitation to members of the Reserve by DPHC has proven to be the best received and most popular aspect of the Reserves health offer. DPHC offers care by way of either utilising a private contract, so that the treatment can be received 6 days a week close to the Reservist's home or work (their choice) or provides rehabilitation at one of the 115 primary care rehabilitation facilities (PCRFs). Changes in access now allow all personnel to refer themselves to rehab (less phase 1 and 2 trainees) and the PCRF route is far more popular. Of the approximately 1100 Reservists that attend for rehab annually, only 10% access the contract.

Dental Inspections. DPHC Dental provide the required restorative work on any Reservist who is nominated to be mobilised (from up to 6 months prior to mobilisation), or are being held at high readiness (R5, 30 days notice to move, or less). This is well received, when Reservists are aware of their entitlement, but DPHC is seeing very low numbers of Reservists accessing this service.

10. The original assumption was that the single Services would contribute £6.5m for the provision of these services (work strand 10 for the FR20 board), the reality is that the money covers both work strand 10 and 12 (recruitment, training and betterment of medical Reserves) leaving a budget of £3.5m for OH services.

Mental Health. DPHC sees very low demand for access to mental health care by members of the Reserve. Since DPHC achieved Full Operating Capability (FOC), the average number of Reservist treated, per annum is 50; less than 1% of the personnel who receive care from DPHC mental health facilities. As DPHC only provides care for operationally attributable conditions, there is very little data pertaining to other mental health problems. Treatment is delivered by the NHS, or the third sector for any other condition and, as Defence medical staff do not have access to Reservist's healthcare records (they are the property of the NHS) it is entirely feasible that Reservists have a number of mental health conditions which are not visible to the Defence Medical Services. This could be better understood if either Regular health checks and/or annual health declarations become the norm.'

We recommend that the three Services further promulgate the OH, rehabilitation, dental and mental health services in order to make Reservists fully aware of the medical services available to them.

28. Separately, one of the key outputs of delivering OH services to the Services is to identify the medical deployability of its personnel. For Regular personnel, this information is gleaned as personnel come forward for routine medicals or medical appointments. At the moment, OH is not given a high priority within Reserve units until personnel are nominated for deployment. DPHC has no way of providing accurate information to the Chain of Command as to the deployability of the Reserve as Reservists do not receive their routine healthcare from DPHC. Such matters only emerge if a Reservist comes forward or has a medical as part of the pre-deployment process.
29. We have commented that the Reserve needs to be routinely used in order to fulfil the Whole Force design. It is, therefore axiomatic that there is a means to make this assessment. **We recommend that consideration is given to a means whereby Reservists submit some form of annual health declaration and/or have routine medicals linked to birthdays.**

ASSESSMENT

30. As we reported last year, the FR20 programme is largely a success. The interest to join the Reserve is there and numbers are on an upward trend. It is problems with the recruiting process itself, articulated fully by the NAO that prevents full manning.
31. The attitudes in the Reserves Continuous Attitude Survey 2018 (RCAS 2018) are largely positive. We assess that the 'offer' – interesting and challenging training, opportunities to deploy, opportunity of self-development, fun and being valued – is being delivered. Of note, these elements feature in the top five reasons for joining and staying in the Reserves in RCAS 18. As we have highlighted above, we believe more can be done to make it easier to deploy on DAOTO.
32. The FR20 programme was very much focussed on numbers as the decline needed to be arrested. Numbers, however, are but a factor in the overall capability of the Reserve and further work needs to continue to ensure that the Reserve is modernised, exploited to the full and used efficiently, as identified in the Commission's report in order to ensure that the Reserve is relevant, useable, credible and flexible.

Annexes:

- A. FR20 Implementation External Scrutiny – Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations External Scrutiny Team Terms of Reference.
- B. External Reporting Provisions of the Defence Reform Act 2014.
- C. Summary of the FR20 Independent Commission's Main Recommendations.
- D. Previous Report Recommendations.
- E. Previous Proposals for Further Work.
- F. Secretary of State for Defence Response to 2018 EST report.
- G. MOD Targets for Strength and Recruitment.
- H. Defence Statistics – Reserve Manning Achievement & Trends.
- I. 2019 Report Main Recommendations.
- J. Summary of Priorities for 2019/20 Work.
- K. External Scrutiny Team – Membership.

COUNCIL OF RESERVE FORCES' AND CADETS' ASSOCIATIONS EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM: TERMS OF REFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

1. The FR20 Report¹ was commissioned by the Prime Minister in October 2010 in recognition of the relative decline and neglect of Reserve Forces.

PURPOSE

2. The Commission identified² a requirement for an annual report on the overall state of the Reserve Forces. It recommended that the Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations (CRFCA) was best placed to meet this requirement, given its existing provision by (non-discretionary) statute to provide independent advice to the Defence Council and Ministers on Reserve Matters. The Defence Reform Act 2014 sets out the duty of the CRFCA to prepare annual reports of the state of the volunteer Reserve Forces. Roles and responsibilities in the production of the reports are set out in the Enabling Agreement³.

ROLE

3. The CRFCA External Scrutiny Team is to report to the Secretary of State for Defence on the state of the volunteer Reserve Forces and provide independent assurance to Parliament.

MEMBERSHIP

4. After consultation with the MOD, the RFCAs will appoint the Chair of the CRFCA External Scrutiny Team. The Chair will be appointed for a maximum of five years.
5. Membership of the External Scrutiny Team should be no greater than eight, to be decided by the Chair after consultation with the MOD through VCDS. It should provide representation from the three single Services, appropriate Regular and Reserve experience and independent expertise. Whilst its composition may change, the External Scrutiny Team must retain the expertise that enables the Chair to perform his duties effectively. The membership should include at least one member who is able to assess the provision made as regards the mental welfare of members and former members of the Reserve Forces.

BASELINE AND METRICS

6. 1 April 12 is to be taken as the baseline date from which progress of the Future Reserves 2020 Programme will be assessed.
7. RF&C will undertake coordinating activity with the single Services to ensure that the External Scrutiny Team has the assistance it requires to enable them to assess trends based on MOD manning and demographic information (such as age). Metrics to be routinely monitored are to be agreed in consultation with the MOD but may include:
 - a. Outflow rate and return of service;
 - b. Fit for Employment; Fit for Role; Fit for Deployment;
 - c. Percentage achieving bounty;
 - d. Gapping levels of Regular, Reserve, FTRS and Civilian Permanent Staff who support the Reserve community.

1. Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces. July 2011.

2. Para 104 (p. 43).

3. Enabling Agreement dated 7 October 2014.

ASSESSMENT

8. The External Scrutiny Team's report is to be set in the context of the ability of the Reserves to deliver capability required by Defence, and should assess the state of the Reserves including:
 - a. progress against delivery of the FR20 Mandates and in the context of the recommendations of the FR20 Report, the condition of the Reserves.and beyond the FR20 Programme:
 - b. the recruiting of members for the volunteer Reserve Forces;
 - c. the retention of members of those Forces;
 - d. the provision of training for those Forces;
 - e. the upkeep of land and buildings for whose management and maintenance the Associations are responsible.
9. CRFCA will be involved in the development of the Plan through the Reserves Coordination Group and the FR20 Programme Board.

ACCESS

10. RF&C will assist in facilitating access to serving military personnel, sites and furnishing additional data as required.

COSTS

11. Funding to cover the External Scrutiny Team's total personal expenses in the order of £9-10K pa⁴ has been agreed. RF&C will provide advice on the submission of claims and recovery of expenses.

MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS

12. Media engagement, if necessary, is to be conducted through MOD DDC in conjunction with RF&C.

DATE AND FREQUENCY OF REPORTS

13. The External Scrutiny Team shall present a report to the Secretary of State for Defence annually, reflecting the requirements of the Defence Reform Act 2014.
14. The Secretary of State for Defence will deliver the report to Parliament.

4. This is recognised as an early estimation and reflecting steady-state costs beyond Yr1. CRFCA can bid for further funding as required as part of GIA.



EXTERNAL REPORTING PROVISIONS OF THE DEFENCE REFORM ACT 2014

The Defence Reform Act 2014 placed a responsibility on Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations to submit an annual report on the state of the UK's Reserve Forces under the following provisions¹:

113A Duty to prepare report on volunteer Reserve Forces

- (1) An association must prepare an annual report on the state of the volunteer reserve forces so far as concerns the area for which the association is established.
- (2) A report on the state of the volunteer reserve forces is a report that sets out the association's assessment of the capabilities of the volunteer reserve forces, having regard to the duties that may be imposed on members of those forces by or under this Act or any other enactment.
- (3) The assessment referred to in subsection (2) must, in particular, include the association's views on the effect of each of the following matters on the capabilities of the volunteer reserve forces:
 - (a) the recruiting of members for the volunteer reserve forces;
 - (b) the retention of members of those forces;
 - (c) the provision of training for those forces;
 - (d) the upkeep of land and buildings for whose management and maintenance the association is responsible.
- (4) A report under subsection (1) must also set out the association's assessment of the provision that is made as regards the mental welfare of members and former members of the volunteer reserve forces.
- (5) An association must send a report under subsection (1) to the Secretary of State –
 - (a) in the case of the first report, before the first anniversary of the day on which the last Future Reserves 2020 report prepared before the coming into force of this section was presented to the Secretary of State, and
 - (b) in the case of subsequent reports, before the anniversary of the day on which the first report was laid before Parliament under subsection (6).
- (6) On receiving a report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
- (7) The duties under this section may, instead of being performed by an association, be performed by a joint committee appointed under section 116 by two or more associations in relation to their combined areas.
- (8) Where by virtue of subsection (7) a joint committee has the duty to prepare a report –
 - (a) references in subsections (1) to (5) to an association are to be read as if they were to the joint committee, and
 - (b) section 117(1)(a) (power to regulate manner in which functions are exercised) has effect as if the reference to associations were to the joint committee.
- (9) In subsection (5)(a), 'Future Reserves 2020 report' means a report prepared by the External Scrutiny Group on the Future Reserves 2020 programme.

1. Inserted in Part 11 of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (reserve associations), after section 113.



SUMMARY OF THE FR20 INDEPENDENT COMMISSION'S MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

Stabilisation and Betterment. Resources are needed immediately to arrest the severe decline in the state of the Reserves. Included in this is the need for a revised Proposition which provides the challenge and reward that makes Reserve service worthwhile and sustainable. This will require enhancements to individual, collective and command training. It will also require increased command opportunities, in peacetime and on operations. The Reserve will require new roles, more viable structures and better mechanisms to integrate with the Regular component. We estimate that a betterment package, when coupled with the need to abate other savings measures against Reserves, will cost £590M over four years.

Revised Roles. The National Security Council should examine the breadth of roles which Reservists undertake. We recommend that Reservists should play a greater part in Homeland Security (for example maritime coastal protection) and UK Resilience. We are not advocating a third force, rather that Reserves should have a more formal role in support of specific security tasks and their local civil communities. More widely, specialist tasks should expand, specifically in areas such as cyber, stabilisation and medical roles in humanitarian crises. Beyond individual operational augmentation, Reserves should be able to meet some operational tasks as formed sub-units and units. And our Reserves must form the framework around which military regeneration can be effected.

Enablement. The availability of a larger and more usable Reserve has to be guaranteed. Such a guarantee has to be underpinned by legislative changes which permit greater ease of mobilisation, better employee protection and greater recognition of employers, perhaps through a nationally endorsed Kitemark. We should exploit the potential for innovative partnerships between Defence, Education and Industry to optimise the sharing and development of human talent. And we need modern administrative systems for enlistment, processing and transfer between the Regular forces and the Reserves.

Adjusting the Regular/Reserve Balance. Defence should adopt a Whole Force Concept which optimises the most cost-effective balance of Regular, Reserve, Contractor and Civilian manpower. Within this, the Reserve element should proportionately increase. By 2015, the trained strength of the Reserves should be: Royal Navy Reserves/Royal Marine Reserves 3,100; Territorial Army 30,000 and Royal Auxiliary Air Force 1,800. Thereafter the size of the Reservist component should increase further to maximise the cost effectiveness of having a larger Reserve component within the Whole Force. The Commission's view is that, in the future, the trained strength of the Army – Regular and Reserve – should be about 120,000.

Force Generation. In order to improve the efficiency of Force Generation, the Reserve estate should be rationalised in a way that is sensitive to maintaining geographically dispersed local links whilst providing access to training. Once we have rebuilt the officer and non-commissioned officer structures, and in the context of more effective Regular: Reserve twinning, the requirements for Regular Permanent Training Staff should be reviewed. And the overall Force Generation ratio within the TA should be optimised so that, if required, a 1:8 ratio of mobilised to non-mobilised Reservists could be sustained.

Governance. A revised governance structure for the Reserve is recommended to: first, oversee the implementation of recommendations arising from this Review; second, to provide an independent mechanism to report to the Ministry of Defence and Parliament on the state of the Reserves; and third, to help ensure the appropriate influence of certain Reserve appointments. The Commission believes that, if these recommendations are carried through, then the overall capability, utility and resilience of our Armed Forces will be enhanced, in a way that meets the security, financial and societal challenges of the day, and in a way that maintains continuity with historic British practice.



PREVIOUS REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY OF 2013 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 13.1 ([Link to the Commission's recommendations 3, 4 & 8](#))

As a matter of priority the Department should issue a plain-English narrative which sets out the Reserves proposition: a narrative which is commonly adopted across all the Services and, as a minimum, covers the purposes of the Reserves; the manner in which they are likely to be used; and individual levels of obligation.

Recommendation 13.2 ([Link to the Commission's recommendations 6 & 12](#))

FR20 manpower metrics should be more granular for the period to 2018 to demonstrate changes within the recruit inflow pipeline and should not concentrate solely on the achievement of Phase-2-trained Reservists.

Recommendation 13.3 ([Link to the Commission's recommendation 26](#))

Priority must be given to fund and introduce quickly an effective management information system which accurately captures Reservists numbers; states of training, preparedness; availability; attendance; and skill sets.

Recommendation 13.4

More analysis is undertaken to determine the causes of 'manning churn', to better inform how retention measures could be better targeted.

Recommendation 13.5 ([Link to the Commission's recommendations 2 & 21](#))

In parallel to development of pairing/parenting responsibilities, further analysis is needed for scaling of equipment and vehicle holdings at Reserve unit level, including the provision of low-tech simulation alternatives.

Recommendation 13.6 ([Link to the Commission's recommendations 5, 6, 17, 18 & 23](#))

FR20 Army basing should take account of regional capacity to recruit, not just to facilitate proximity, and should also be phased to initially preserve current TA manpower until such time as alternative inflow is more fully developed.

Recommendation 13.7 ([Link to the Commission's recommendations 8, 22 & 23](#))

That work is initiated to look at the potential to employ Reserves with critical skills, where their employment was best served in a reach-back rather than deployed role; and that their TACOS be examined for appropriate adjustment.

Recommendation 13.8 ([Link to the Commission's report, Annex C, paragraph 8](#))

That senior military and political leadership initiate a comprehensive information campaign with the Services' middle management to address the cultural change necessary to secure FR20, drawing on the narrative we recommend above.

SUMMARY OF 2014 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 14.1 Further work on Whole Force and the New Employment Model, coupled with the desirability of easier transfers between Regular and Reserve service, suggest that the necessity of merging the Armed Forces' Act and the Reserve Forces' Act should be kept under review.

Recommendation 14.2 The narrative developed for the White Paper should be updated to take account of FR20 delivery to date and used more extensively to market the value of Reserve service and the recruiting offer. It should also be used more extensively cross-Government.

Recommendation 14.3 FR20 measures which seek to bring down the average age of Reservists should be phased to follow those measures which will rely heavily on Reservist knowledge and experience for their introduction.

Recommendation 14.4 The single Services should examine the scope to apply a 'special measures approach' to turning round those units and sub-units most in need of assistance in reaching FR20 targets.

Recommendation 14.5 The single Services should examine a range of measures which better preserve the corporate memory of their Reserve components, including procedures for recording whether and how savings measures are planned to be restored during programming.

Recommendation 14.6 Recruiting processes should be subject to continuous improvement measures, with recognition that central marketing and advertising campaigns must be complemented by appropriately funded local/unit activity to nurture and retain applicants through the process.

Recommendation 14.7 Final decisions on Reserve Centre laydown and unit/sub-unit closures should be re-tested against local recruiting capacity and retention factors.

Recommendation 14.8 In order to ensure that necessary differences between Regular and Reserve service are appropriately managed, the single Services should consider the reintroduction of a dedicated Reserve career management staff branch (predominantly manned and led by Reservists) within their Personnel Headquarters.

Recommendation 14.9 Command appointments of Reserve units should continue to provide opportunity for part-time volunteer officers. When part-time volunteers are appointed, command team manning of the unit should be reviewed to ensure that the commanding officer is fully supported with no gapping in key headquarters posts.

Recommendation 14.10 The MOD should consider the option to restore the FR20 Commission's proposal that a contingency reserve fund should be established to be available for short duration domestic operations making use of Reserves.

SUMMARY OF 2015 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 15.1 The MOD give further consideration to how it will safeguard the ability of Reserves to play a proportionate part in resilience operations, especially once the Reserves are at full manning and would otherwise have to dilute funds for annual training to offset costs.

Recommendation 15.2 Working within the existing governance system, build more inter-Service cooperation on experimentation and best practice on recruiting and retention, whether or not initiatives are universally adopted.

Recommendation 15.3 The three Services should review the separate roles played by the national call centres, the Armed Forces Careers Offices, the recruiting field forces and Reserve units to ensure that they are clearly optimised for Reserve recruiting.

Recommendation 15.4 The MOD and the Services should review the medical entry standards required of recruits and ensure that the screening contracts are appropriately incentivised and assured to achieve success.

Recommendation 15.5 The Services should initiate work to determine the recruiting resources necessary to ensure steady state manning of the Reserve beyond the FR20 period.

Recommendation 15.6 The Services should examine what more could be done to enhance manning through retention-positive measures, at least in the short-term, including bespoke extra-mural activities targeted at the Reserve.

Recommendation 15.7 FR20 planning and risk mitigation should increasingly turn more attention to the growth of capability within the Reserve component, rather than a slavish pursuit of numerical growth.

Recommendation 15.8 Army Reserve basing requirements should be revisited as a consequence of availability of funds to deliver the original basing concept and on the evidence of other FR20 achievement; link to Recommendation 15.10.

Recommendation 15.9 DIO and the Services should review their multi activity and support contracts and, where relevant, explore ways in which they can be amended to ensure that they are Reserve-friendly.

Recommendation 15.10 The Services should conduct a command-led stock-take on all aspects of FR20 implementation by the end of FY 2015/16 and share lessons learned; link with Recommendation 15.8.

SUMMARY OF 2016 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 16.1 An urgent contract review of the Army Recruiting Partnership.

Recommendation 16.2 The Services undertake more granular analysis within their data gathering, to reduce the risk of specialist manning gaps in the final years of FR20 and beyond.

Recommendation 16.3 The high incidence of medical deferrals and time to resolution remain under close scrutiny in order to reduce both.

Recommendation 16.4 The Royal Navy and Army absorb recent innovations in officer Phase 1 training into their core officer development activity, as the issue will require sustained attention well beyond the timeframe of FR20.

Recommendation 16.5 Consideration be given to greater cross-pollination, shared practice and coordination between the three Services in the officer recruiting environment, particularly in the area of achieving greater penetration of the Higher and Further Education recruiting hinterland.

Recommendation 16.6 The Services keep under review the impact of losing Op FORTIFY enhancements (or Service equivalents) and, where appropriate to sustain recruiting beyond 2019, bring relevant elements into their core activity.

Recommendation 16.7 The Services examine units which have a significant young officer deficit to determine whether a poor proposition might be the cause and, if so, to assess whether it can be legitimately improved.

Recommendation 16.8 The Army consider how the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force use their Reserves in order to develop a better understanding of potential use of Auxiliaries in the Army Reserve; and that such analysis helps shape policies for the future employment system.

Recommendation 16.9 The Army revisits the decision to withdraw LADs from Reserve units to create REME battalions.

Recommendation 16.10 The manner in which Reserves can be routinely employed on national operations or for back-fill be revisited.

Recommendation 16.11 The Reserve narrative be reviewed to ensure it cannot be interpreted as intent to prevent use of Reservists for routine mobilisation and on national operations.

Recommendation 16.12 Work on defining the Army Reserve officer career pathway be re-invigorated.

Recommendation 16.13 Defence reviews whether a more flexible range of employment terms should be considered, to better incentivise recruitment and to provide more agility within a Whole Force approach to employment.

Recommendation 16.14 As options are considered for disposal of Regular estate, decisions are not taken before current or potential usefulness to Reserve capability-building has also been taken into account.

Recommendation 16.15 MOD and the Services recognise incomplete cultural change will be the main impediment to FR20 delivery and long-term Reserve sustainability, and introduce specific measures to inculcate cultural change.

Recommendation 16.16 The importance of localism for effective sub-unit command be addressed by simplifying systems where possible; providing adequate permanent staff support; and keeping training requirements at practical levels.

SUMMARY OF 2017 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 17.1 A repeat recommendation that a formal contract review of the Recruiting Partnership be undertaken. (Paragraph 19)

Recommendation 17.2 That the continued employment of RSUSOs is revisited. (Paragraph 20)

Recommendation 17.3 That the use of medical waivers during recruiting should be better advertised to RN and Army units, and other relevant participants in the recruiting chain. (Paragraph 21)

Recommendation 17.4 That the Army should examine where the medical waiver authority is best lodged. (Paragraph 21)

Recommendation 17.5 That the single Services should review their recruiting medical contracts to ensure assessments are carried out with a greater degree of consistency and common sense. (Paragraph 23)

Recommendation 17.6 That the Services identify which units have experienced the most successful officer recruitment and explore the best means by which their successes can then be exported to less successful units. (Paragraph 24)

Recommendation 17.7 The Army should revitalise work to create a Reserve officer career pathway. (Paragraph 28)

Recommendation 17.8 That the Army develop and implement a policy to support appropriately Reserve unit commanding officers when the incumbent is a part time volunteer. (Paragraph 30)

Recommendation 17.9 That the MOD, Joint Forces Command and the single Services review the terms under which Reserves are included on or in support of operations, in order to develop protocols which make their inclusion easier. (Paragraph 35)

Recommendation 17.10 That the Services resist short-term in-year budgetary palliatives which directly or indirectly reduce routine Reserve activity. (Paragraph 37)

Recommendation 17.11 That the Services now initiate work to determine optimum return-of-service/retention rate(s) for their Reserves and put in place measures to achieve them, with the same vigour that they have applied in their recruiting effort. (Paragraph 39)

Recommendation 17.12 That work on the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing VE until a new strategy can be implemented. (Paragraph 48)

Recommendation 17.13 That the MOD update the work on mental health in the Services that it has undertaken with King's College and commission fresh work to look specifically at the current situation for Reserves. (Paragraph 51)

SUMMARY OF 2018 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 18.1 Given the challenging recruiting environment encountered by the three Services and the failure of the DRS, we recommend that the MOD and Services do not take further savings measures from the FR20 £1.8bn funding to manage FY18 in-year financial pressures. (Paragraph 15)

Recommendation 18.2 We would welcome an update on the proposed revisions to JSP 950 when these actions are completed. (Paragraph 22)

Recommendation 18.3 Given the criticality of DRS to the inflow of applicants to recruits, we recommend that 'Hypercare' is continued until all three services are confident that DRS works as intended reducing the 'time of flight' between application and being loaded on a Phase 1 recruit training course. (Paragraph 26)

Recommendation 18.4 Linked to paragraphs 16-26 above, until the frictions in the recruiting system are ironed out, whether induced by DRS or Service policies, we recommend that Op FORTIFY measures, such as the RSUSO, are continued beyond FR20 until the Services hit their trained strength FR20 targets and they are confident that manning is on an even plateau. (Paragraph 27)

Recommendation 18.5 We recommend that the three Services continue to examine that their courses - particularly those run by Training Schools - policies and processes and are adapted to take account of the needs of the reservist. (Paragraph 32)

Recommendation 18.6 We recommend that MOD produce an agreed costing method to compare the cost of regulars and reservists, drawing on the above work and that done by the Land Environment Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCOC), and examine the opportunities to further increase their utility and value to Defence. (Paragraph 36)

Recommendation 18.7 We continue to recommend that MOD should consider the option to restore the FR20 Commission's proposal to establish a contingency reserve fund to be available for short notice and duration operations. (Paragraph 37)

Recommendation 18.8 That the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing Reserve estate until the new strategy is implemented. (Paragraph 49)

PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER WORK

2013/14 WORK

- Medical Reserves, to ensure coherence with single Service plans.
- Manpower metrics.
- Manpower MIS.
- Unit and sub-unit leadership and management.
- The recruiting & training pipelines and process effectiveness.
- Development of integrated training and (where relevant) pairing mechanisms.
- Harmonisation of training directives and resources.
- Enhanced measures for engaging with employers.
- Improved relationships with employers.
- Families' welfare.
- Terms and Conditions of Service.
- Cost of Reserves.

2014/15 WORK

- Terms and Conditions of Service for Reserves.
- Medical screening process and regional performance.
- Maritime Reserves pipeline improvement pilots.
- Reserve officer recruiting, training and development.
- The Reserve recruiting and training pipeline to Phase 2.
- Concepts of employment and manning for the Medical Reserves.
- Contractual constraints.
- Single Service arrangements for personnel and career management of Reserves.

2015/16 WORK

Review

- An assessment of the conclusions and implementation of adjustments arising from the Army Reserve Stock-take; parallel reviews within the other Services; and arrangements to share findings.
- Progress with the Reserve Footprint Strategy.

Funding

- Costing and cost comparison modelling.
- Governance and assurance arrangements for the £1.8bn FR20 funding.

Capability

- Development and growth of Reserve capabilities. Initial points of interest:
 - › Joint and single Service progress with Medical capability.
 - › Arrangements for Reserves use within employing formations.
 - › Development of defence engagement and resilience roles for Reserves.
 - › Refinement of the proposition, with particular attention to officers.
 - › Achievement of mandated collective training at unit and sub-unit level.

Manning, Recruiting and Training

- Progress towards FR20 manning levels.
- Sustainability of long-term support arrangements for Reserves, particularly to maintain inflow once measures such as Op FORTIFY have run their course.

- Effectiveness of retention positive activity.
- Capacity of Phase 2 and 3 training arrangements.

Management

- Progress with personnel management change implementation.

Betterment

- Provision and availability of unit equipment.
- Provision and availability of individual and collective training opportunity.

Infrastructure

- Progress with FR20 basing.

2016/17 WORK

Policy Review

- An assessment of the impact of Army 2020 Refine work on the Army Reserve.
- Progress with the Reserve Footprint Strategy.
- Applicability and application of the Reserves narrative.

Funding

- Costing and cost comparison modelling.
- Arrangements for final programme reconciliation of the £1.8bn FR20 funding.
- Impact of post SDSR 15 efficiency measures and budget pressures.

Capability

- Development and growth of Reserve capabilities; points of interest:
 - › Joint and single Service progress with Medical capability.
 - › Arrangements for Reserves to be routinely mobilised and used.
 - › Development of defence engagement and resilience roles for Reserves.
 - › Refinement of the proposition, with particular attention to officers.
 - › Achievement of mandated collective training at unit and sub-unit level.
 - › Impact of efficiency measures on capability development.

Manning, Recruiting and Training

- Progress towards FR20 manning levels.
- Sustainability of long-term support arrangements for Reserves, post Op FORTIFY.
- Effectiveness of retention positive activity.
- Entry Medical deferrals and rates of resolution.
- Training output standards and provision for progression from Phase 1 to Phase 3.
- Coherence of statements of training requirements (SOTR) with future employability.
- Policies for establishing and maintaining the training and manning margin.

Management

- Progress with personnel management change implementation.
- Progress creating an Army Reserve officer career pathway.
- Measures to build on initiatives such as the Engineer Staff Corps.
- Arrangements for professional development for young officers and SNCOs.

Infrastructure

- Progress with FR20 basing and coherence with the Basing Strategy.

Cultural Change

- Measures to effect cultural change and measurement of their effectiveness.

2017/18 WORK**Policy Review**

- Progress with the Reserve Footprint and Basing Strategies.
- Progress with the Future Employment System.

Funding

- Attribution and final programme reconciliation of the £1.8B FR20 funding.
- Impact of post SDSR 15 efficiency measures and budget pressures.

Capability

- Development and use of Reserve capabilities (all Services):
 - › Joint and single Service progress with Medical capability.
 - › Arrangements for Reserves to be routinely mobilised and used.
 - › Integration with employing formations.
 - › Arrangements for Reserves to support 'other formation' exercises.
 - › Progress with skills mapping.

Manning, Recruiting and Training

- Steady state support arrangements for Reserves.
- Effectiveness of retention positive activity.
- Entry Medical deferrals and rates of resolution.
- Phase 2 and Phase 3 training (including establishment visits).
- Progress to establish and maintain training and manning margin.

Management

- Progress with personnel management change implementation.
- Progress creating an Army Reserve officer career pathway.
- Arrangements for professional development for young officers and SNCOs.

Infrastructure

- Progress with FR20 basing and coherence with the Basing Strategy.

Cultural Change

- Measures to effect cultural change and measurement of their effectiveness.

Specific Visits

- RFCA-arranged Reserve Centre visits in and around: Leeds, Greater London, South East England, East Anglia and East Midlands.
- Headquarters CGRM, RN Capability Directors, Headquarters 1 Division, Headquarters 1 and 38 Group.
- Exercise Joint Warrior.

2018/19 WORK**Policy Review**

- Optimisation of the Reserve Estate.

Funding

- Impact of saving or efficiency measures on the £1.8bn FR20 funding

Capability

- Deployed medical support to the Reserves
- RAF's Force Protection

Manning, Recruiting and Training

- Manning targets on the completion of FR20 Programme.
- Medical entry standards and rates of resolution.
- Effectiveness of DRS.
- Delivery of the 'Offer'
- Delivery of Phase 2 and 3 training and training by defence training schools, such as at Leconfield.
- Newly established Army 2020 Refine battalions and paired units on training.
- Arms/Trades/Specialist sponsors of Phase 3 training – both at the training establishments and staff within Service headquarters.

Specific Visits

- RFCA arranged visits to units in: North West England, North East England, Scotland, West Midlands, Northern Ireland.
- Headquarters RN, Army, RAF, Headquarters 3 Division, Headquarters 77 Brigade.
- Headquarters Surgeon General and 2 Medical Brigade.
- Land Information Assurance Group, Joint Cyber Unit and Joint Services Signal Unit – Corsham.
- Exercise JOINT WARRIOR.



SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE RESPONSE TO 2018 EST REPORT

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4.4.2.10

10 December 2018

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read 'Dear Major General Lalor', is written over a faint, illegible typed name.

In my letter of 20 July 2018 to Lt Gen Brims, I said I would write again after we had considered the recommendations made on the External Scrutiny Team's 2018 report in detail. Specific comments on each of the recommendations are at the Annex to this letter, but I should also like to respond more generally to the report.

May I begin by formally welcoming you to the role of Chairman of the External Scrutiny Team. I hope that you and the rest of the Team continue to enjoy the experience and I look forward to receiving your future reports.

It was pleasing to see the positive comments in the report this year, along with the acknowledgement of the work that has been done to deliver the revitalised Reserve Forces that were envisaged when the Future Reserves programme was launched. We would all acknowledge, however, that there is still work to be done to grow and maintain the Reserves and the report also contains timely warnings about the risk of becoming complacent or taking the Reserves for granted.

We recognise how vital it is that we maintain the quality of the offer to Reservists. The opportunity to train, work and deploy alongside their Regular counterparts is key to this and we have continued to offer those opportunities. Reservists have once again provided invaluable support on operations and other Defence activity in the UK and worldwide, including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics, the continuing campaign to counter Daesh, global counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations, Maritime Security and on the operation in and around Salisbury following the attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and the subsequent poisoning of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley.

Maj Gen (Retd) S F N Lalor CB TD
The Council of RFCAs
Holderness House
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London
EC2A 4EY

Enclosure(s)

The most recent Continuous Attitude Survey shows that Reservists continue to feel very positive about their experience, with more than nine out of ten saying they are proud to be in the Reserves and almost as many saying they would recommend joining to others. And, for most, the experience of being in the Reserves is as good as, or better than, they expected it to be. This reassures me that we are delivering on the offer. But, of course, there is still more that we can do.

I am, for example, in full agreement that it must be made easier and quicker for people to join the Reserves. We need to devote greater energy to simplifying and speeding up the application and enlistment process, making use of technology as far as we can and maintaining better contact with candidates throughout. We recognise that the competition to attract and recruit skilled people is increasing and we cannot afford to risk good candidates losing interest because they feel that they are not receiving attention in a timely manner. The Defence Recruiting System will play a key part in helping us to make recruitment better and I am reassured that the System is now beginning to deliver the capabilities and benefits that were envisaged when the project began.

We are looking more broadly at the conditions of service for Reservists. For example, where Reservists from different Services are working alongside each other within the same function or on the same task, it seems reasonable that, as far as possible, they should receive the same level of reward. Where we are employing Reservists full-time, we need to ensure that their commitments properly reflect what they will be expected to do, while still enabling the Services to make full use of their abilities. If we are to achieve a genuinely "whole force" ethos, Reservists must not feel disadvantaged or taken for granted when they are doing comparable work to Regulars or other reservists.


We are also considering how best we can extend the amount of time for which Reservists can be employed without the need to be mobilised. This will increase the range of tasks for which we can use them, including contributing to UK resilience operations. I am very keen that we should use Reservists in this way, because they are a part of the whole force and they can, and should, help to share the responsibility with the Regular forces. This can only increase their value to their local communities and society and, in turn, help to maintain and grow motivation among Reservists.

The report contains several recommendations relating to the budget for and costs of the Reserves. I understand the Team's expressed concerns about the effect that savings measures can have. I am very conscious that, if Reservists perceive that they are not being treated as well as Regulars, including having access to training and facilities, they may leave. The Reserves are vital in helping the MOD to make the best use of its resources. By undertaking frequent training (and, where they are specialists, by working in their everyday jobs) they enable us to maintain capability at a relatively low cost while also being ready to step up to fill

gaps when needed. Our Reserves are there to be used and they want to be used and we must not lose sight of that. I am most grateful to them for their commitment.

We do, of course, also need to recognise that most of our volunteer Reservists have jobs or business interests in the civilian sector. As the work that we are doing develops, and as the strategic environment within which we are operating continues to evolve, we may very well need to seek more assistance from the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations to engage with employers and businesses and help us to understand any concerns they might have about the impact that making greater use of the Reserves could have on them. I am confident the Associations will be ready to provide this support if and when it is needed.

Thank you once again for the report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Gavin Williamson', with a large, stylized 'G' as the first letter.

THE RT HON GAVIN WILLIAMSON CBE MP

RFCA EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- 18.1 Given the challenging recruiting environment encountered by the three Services and the failure of the DRS, we recommend that the MOD and Services do not take further savings measures from the FR20 £1.8 billion funding to manage Financial Year 2018-19 in-year financial pressures.**

We remain committed to maintaining the quality of the offer that we make to Reservists and potential recruits. However, we also have to manage resources carefully throughout the year in order to remain within our Parliamentary Control Totals. We do recognise that in-year savings measures can have a disproportionate effect on the Reserves and this is why any such measures are only taken after very careful consideration of the alternatives.

- 18.2 We would welcome an update on the proposed revisions of JSP 950 when these actions are completed.**

Surgeon General's staff have made significant progress in refining JSP 950 medical entry standards with the single Services. The refinements include: a revised process for granting waivers to those potential entrants who are below the entry standards; a review and relaxation of entry standards for candidates with common mental health conditions; and a revised process to propose policy amendments to the JSP. There is ongoing work to further harmonise the medical appeals process and reduce the time an appeal takes. Work is also in train to understand the single Service appetite for risk in this area and identify where else entry standards might be further relaxed or interpreted more flexibly. These policy changes apply equally to Regulars and Reserves but there is some specific work looking at entry standards for specialist Reserve groups who have minimal deployment requirements, such as Cyber.

- 18.3 Given the criticality of DRS to the inflow of applicants to recruits, we recommend that "Hypercare" is continued until all three Services are confident that DRS works as intended reducing the "time of flight" between application and being loaded on a Phase 1 recruit training course.**

Many of the major issues affecting the Defence Recruiting System have been resolved and it was agreed to end DRS hypercare on 30 June this year. Separately to DRS, the Army is working with Capita on further steps to reduce the time it takes for candidates to move from application to being loaded to a Phase 1 training course and parallel work is being conducted by the other Services.

- 18.4 Until the frictions in the recruiting system are ironed out, whether induced by DRS or Service policies, we recommend that Operation FORTIFY measures, such as the RSUSO, are continued beyond FR20 until the Services hit their trained strength FR20 targets, and they are confident that manning is on an even plateau.**

The Services are working independently and with Capita to improve the recruiting process and reduce the time of flight from application to Phase 1 training. While the Army's Operation FORTIFY is due to conclude in March 2020, Regimental Sub-Unit Support Officers have been extended in their existing posts until 31 March 2021 as part of the continuing recruiting effort.

- 18.5 We would recommend that [establishing strong ties with UOTCs] is an example of best practice that the other two Services might examine in order to encourage and increase commissioning within their Reserves.**

Liaison between the Maritime Reserve and the RAuxAF and their respective University Service Units is already good and there are mechanisms in place to allow the three Services to share examples of best practice. The RAuxAF does not have a significant requirement to recruit commissioned personnel, the main need being in the medical and intelligence capability areas.

- 18.6 We recommend that the three Services continue to examine that their courses - particularly those run by Training Schools - policies and processes are adapted to take account of the needs of the Reservist.**

There are many variables which are kept under continual review to ensure that reservist training courses are delivered in a reservist-friendly way, at appropriate and accessible locations. The Army has defined the principles of reserve-friendly training and will be increasing emphasis on this in 2019.

- 18.7 We recommend that MOD produce an agreed costing method to compare the cost of Regulars and Reserves, drawing on the above work and that done by the Land Environment Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCO), and examine the opportunities to further increase their utility and value to Defence.**

The studies that have already been carried out provide evidence that the Reserves are good value for money and that, even for the most stressing deployment pattern, two Reserve sub-units are less expensive than a single Regular sub-unit. We are considering whether there are ways to better manage in-year cash flow so that we can better utilise Reserves, whether this is on mobilisation or on Reserve Service Days.

18.8 We continue to recommend that MOD should consider the option to restore the FR20 Commission's proposal to establish a contingency reserve fund to be available for short notice and duration operations.

For the Army, the Chief of the General Staff has directed that a pool of 5,000 Reserve Service Days be earmarked for use by Army Reservists on such operations. There is utility in such a fund, but the financial element is only one part of ensuring that Reserves are available within readiness timelines. Manpower, equipment, training and sustainability considerations are also important to ensure that there is a deployable capability. There is also a continuing risk that, if the funding is not used for this purpose, it may be lost. There is, therefore equal merit in ensuring that all available funding is used for betterment of the offer to Reservists, including opportunities to deploy.

18.9 That the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing Reserve estate until the new strategy is implemented.

Responsibility for the upkeep of their estate now lies with the Single Services. This means that they will be required to manage their Reserves estate as a part of their whole estate strategy, engaging with the Defence Infrastructure Organisation and the RFCAs as necessary. This is the position the Maritime Reserve has been pursuing throughout the FR20 programme. The Army has agreed principles for reserve basin and a strategy for overall rationalisation is being prepared. In support of this, assurance is being sought that receipts from the planned Army disposals following FR20 may be reinvested into the existing Army Reserve estate to bring it up to FR20 operating requirements. RAF use of the Reserves estate is limited, as most RAuxAF Units are located within Regular bases.

MOD TARGETS FOR RESERVE STRENGTH AND RECRUITING

The table shows trained strength targets for the Maritime Reserve, Army Reserve and Royal Auxiliary Air Force up to FY 2019.

Table 1	Target	End FY 13	End FY 14	End FY 15	End FY 16	End FY 17	End FY 18
Maritime Reserve	Trained Strength	1,780	1,790	1,900	2,320	2,790	3,100
Army Reserve	Trained Strength	18,800	19,900	20,200	22,900	26,100	30,100
Royal Auxiliary Air Force	Trained Strength	1,200	1,400	1,600	1,860	1,860	1,860
Total	Trained Strength	21,780	23,090	23,700	27,080	30,750	35,060



DEFENCE STATISTICS - RESERVE MANNING ACHIEVEMENT & TRENDS¹

Headline Figures

Table 1. Total and trained strength of the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20).

	2014 1 Apr	2015 1 Apr	2016 1 Apr	2017 1 Apr	2018 1 Apr	2019 1 Apr	Change 2018/2019
All Services							
Total strength	28,150	30,810	34,760	36,220	36,260 r	36,400	+ 150
Trained strength	23,360	24,630	27,270 II	31,360	32,200 r	32,560	+ 360
Maritime Reserve							
Total strength	2,850	3,160	3,540	3,560	3,600	3,850	+ 260
Trained strength	1,870	1,980	2,350	2,560	2,760	2,830	+ 70
Army Reserve							
Total strength	23,580	25,440	28,670	29,940	29,710	29,470	- 240
Trained strength	20,060	21,030	23,030 II	26,660	29,960	27,070	+ 120
RAF Reserves							
Total strength	1,720	2,220	2,540	2,730	2,950 r	3,080	+ 130
Trained strength	1,440	1,620	1,890	2,150	2,480 r	2,660	+ 170

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)


Appendices:

1. Maritime Reserves
2. Army Reserves
3. RAF Reserves
4. Officer data
5. Qualifying notes

1. Data is drawn from the Defence Statistics Report as at 1 Apr 2018.

Maritime Reserve

Maritime Reserve Strength



Maritime Reserve Cumulative Financial Year to date Intake




Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force)

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

Maritime Reserve Quarterly Gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow



Note:


Gains to trained strength figures comprise personnel who complete Phase 2 training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the Maritime Reserve.

Army Reserve

Army Reserve Strength



Army Reserve Cumulative Financial Year to date Intake



Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force).

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

Army Reserve Quarterly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow




Note:

Gains to trained strength figures comprises personnel who complete Phase 1 (post-October 2016) training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the Army Reserve. Break in series represents the **change in definition of Army Trained Strength** in October 2016 from Phase 2 to Phase 1 trained. Gains to trained strength and outflow from trained strength data are unavailable for the month of September 2016 as a result.

RAuxAF

RAF Reserve Strength



RAF Reserve cumulative financial year to date Intake



Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force).

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

RAF Reserve monthly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow



Note:

Gains to trained strength figures comprises personnel who complete Phase 2 training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the RAF Reserves.

Officers

Table 2a Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the Maritime Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2014 to 31 Mar 2015	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019
Officers strength at start of period	840	900	1,040	1,120	1,160
Intake to Officers	150	220	200	150	190
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	140	210	180	140	180
Rank to Officer in the Maritime Reserve	30	80	50	60	70
Regulars	80	80	100	70	90
University Service Units	10	10	10	~	~
No previous service	10	10	20	~	10
Outflow from Officers	90	80	120	110 r	120
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	30	20	20	20	20
Regulars	10	~	10	10	10
Left the Armed Forces	60	60	100	100	90
Officers strength at end of period	900	1,040	1,120	1,160	1,230

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Table 2b Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the Army Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2014 to 31 Mar 2015	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019
Officers strength at start of period	4,350	4,490	4,840	5,100	5,410
Intake to Officers	620	760	680	750	660
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	550	640	600	670	600
Rank to Officer in the Army Reserve	80	100	100	120	120
Regulars	250	320	300	290	280
University Service Units	140	170	140	140	110
No previous service	70	110	90	80	60
Outflow from Officers	470	400	430	440	480
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	140	120	170	140	150
Regulars	60	70	100	80	90
Left the Armed Forces	340	280	260	300	330
Officers strength at end of period	4,490	4,840	5,090	5,410	5,590

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Table 2c Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the RAF Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2014 to 31 Mar 2015	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019
Officers strength at start of period	290	340	390	430	530
Intake to Officers	80	100	80	170	150
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	70	90	80	150	130
Rank to Officer in the RAF Reserve	10	20	10	~	20
Regulars	40	60	60	110	80
University Service Units	~	-	~	-	-
No previous service	10	~	~	20	20
Outflow from Officers	30	50	40	70 r	60
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	10	20	10	40 r	30
Regulars	~	~	~	~	10
Left the Armed Forces	20	30	30	30	30
Officers strength at end of period	340	390	430	530 r	620

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Accompanying Notes to Tables

1. Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) includes Volunteer Reserves who are mobilised, HRR and Volunteer Reserve personnel serving on ADC or FTRS contracts. Sponsored Reserves provide a more cost effective solution than Volunteer Reserves are also included in the Army Reserve FR20. Non Regular Permanent Staff (NRPS), Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI) and University Officer Cadets and Regular Reservists are excluded.
2. Trained Strength comprises military personnel who have completed Phase 1 and 2 training for Maritime Reserve, the Army Reserve (prior to 1 October 2016) and the Royal Air Force Reserves. Following the change in definition of trained strength from 1 October 2016, trained strength for the Army Reserve comprises of personnel who have completed Phase 1 training.
3. Intake and outflow statistics are calculated from month-on-month comparisons of officer strength data. There has been a minor change in the methodology used to produce Reserves statistics from 1 April 2017. This now allows us to capture individuals who intake and outflow within the same month. For example, if an individual joins on 3 March and leaves on 29 March they are now counted as an intake and an outflow under the new methodology, whereas previously this would not have been identifiable. The net effect of this change on our Statistics is negligible and the figures above would not differ from that calculated previously by greater than ten personnel. This change does, however, improve both the accuracy and efficiency of our processes by, for example improving identification of those Officers who previously served in University Service Units.
4. Intake to the FR20 shows the most recent previous service recorded on JPA including those serving in another Reserve Service. Personnel may have had a break in service and may have served in more than one role. Intake from University Service Units figures just show that someone has been in a University Service Unit at some point in our data; they may not have moved straight into the FR20 directly after leaving. Only ex-Cadets are counted as an intake from University Service Units. Army Officers include Army Officer Cadets.
5. Outflow from the FR20 includes those personnel moving to another part of the Armed Forces within the calendar month. 'Left the Armed Forces' may include those who have a break in service before joining another part of the Armed Forces.
6. Intake and outflow from the Regular Forces includes transfers from/to another service.
7. University Service Units includes University Royal Navy Units (URNU), University Officer Training Corps (UOTC), University Air Squadrons (UAS) and Defence Technical Undergraduate Scheme (DTUS). Individuals counted ex-Cadets with a prior assignment type of one of these on the JPA system. Note that an individual does not have to have been serving in the University Service Unit associated with their future Reserve Service e.g. an individual may have joined the Army Reserve after serving in the URNU.

Rounding

Figures have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in '5' have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias. Totals and subtotals have been rounded separately and may not equal the sum of their rounded parts.

Symbols

- r Figure revised since last publication
- ~ 5 or fewer
- Zero
- .. Data not available
- || Discontinuity marker

2019 REPORT MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

- 19.1** The MOD and the Services do not take further savings measures from the FR20 £1.8bn funding, given the FR20 programme trained strength targets have been missed and ask MOD and all Services to clarify what funding remains, and plans to spend it over the next four years. (Paragraph 7)
- 19.2** That: the Services determine what is the optimum percentage of Reservists within a deployed force (between 5-8%), which meets the requirement to mobilise Reservists to sustain the Whole Force Model, while being sustainable in the long-term, and fund this accordingly in their annual spending programme. (Paragraph 12)
- 19.3** That they [initiatives to allow for mobilisation on training tasks and a tiered mobilisation package for DAOTO] are developed further as a matter of priority, particularly the tiered mobilisation package as it would broaden the range of manning levers available to Commander, and thus enhance the utility of the Reserve, and answer the requirements to modernise, exploit and use the Reserve more efficiently as identified by the Commission. (Paragraph 16)
- 19.4** That:
- The three Services review their ongoing support arrangements for Reserve recruiting, to ensure the successful lessons of FR20 are not discarded; and
 - RSUSOs are taken onto units' permanent strengths now in recognition of the vital role they play. (Paragraph 18b)
- 19.5** That similar work being done by the Australians and Canadians to minimise the steps in the [recruiting] process (including introducing a one-stop shop) is studied closely before the contract is re-let. We further recommend that ambitious targets should be set – one month if there are no issues, and six months if there are, and success or failure should be judged on these targets. (Paragraph 19)
- 19.6** That the Services continue the drive to adapt their Service policies and practices to take account of the needs of the Reservist. (Paragraph 21)
- 19.7** We recommend that the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force consider adopting such a system in order to ensure reservist knowledge and input is considered during policy formulation and operational planning, and be able to grow a Reservist (part time) two star officer. (Paragraph 22)
- 19.8** Identified and approved FR20 [infrastructure] projects are not subject to the 'exceptions, suspension' regime in order that agreed funding for the estate is spent as intended and not delayed. (Paragraph 25)
- 19.9** That the three Services further promulgate the OH, rehabilitation, dental and mental health services in order to make Reservists fully aware of the medical services available to them. (Paragraph 27)
- 19.10** That consideration is given to a means whereby Reservists submit some form of 'annual health declaration and/or have routine medicals linked to birthdays'. (Paragraph 29)

SUMMARY OF PRIORITIES FOR 2019/20 WORK

In addition to the formal requirements set out in the Reserve Forces Act, the following themes will be examined during the 2019/20 reporting period:

Policy Review

- Optimisation of the Reserve Estate

Funding

- The spend of the £1.8bn FR20 funding

Capability

- Mobilised reservists to 3 Commando Brigade
- Mobilised reservists for the Off Shore Patrol Vessels

Manning, Recruiting, Retention and Training

- Manning targets post the FR20 Programme
- Recruiting 'Time of Flight'
- Effectiveness of DRS
- Delivery of the 'Offer'
- Arms/Trades/Specialist sponsors of Phase 3 training - both at the training establishments and staff within Service headquarters

Specific Visits

- RFCA arranged visits to units in: Wales, South West England, Scotland, London, East Midlands, South East England
- Headquarters RN, Army, RAF, Headquarters 1 Division,
- Land Information Assurance Group, Joint Cyber Unit - Corsham
- Exercises with a significant reserve presence, for example JOINT WARRIOR and AGILE STANCE



EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM – MEMBERSHIP

Chairman:

Major General (Retd) S F N Lalor CB TD

Members:

Brigadier (Retd) P R Mixer OStJ QVRM TD DL

Captain (Retd) I M Robinson OBE RD RNR

Colonel (Retd) G Straughan OBE TD

Air Vice-Marshal (Retd) P D Luker CB OBE AFC DL

Clerk:

Major General (Retd) J H Gordon CB CBE





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